@article{633ea73ec6354484875e0110f3776aca,
title = "Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information",
abstract = "Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as passive, symmetric or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes no restrictions on beliefs: we select the action profile that is supported in equilibrium by the largest set of beliefs. We conduct an experiment to compare the predictive power of the existing and our novel selection criteria in an application on vertical multi-lateral contracting. We find that our criterion outperforms the other selection criteria.",
keywords = "Equilibrium selection, Imperfect information, Multiple equilibria, Passive beliefs, Symmetric beliefs, Vertical contracting",
author = "Eguia, {Jon X.} and Aniol Llorente-Saguer and Rebecca Morton and Antonio Nicol{\`o}",
note = "Funding Information: We thank Antonio Cabrales, Laurent Denant-Boemont, Christoph Engel, Ignacio Esponda, Kristoffel Grechenig, Sergiu Hart, PJ Healy, Asen Ivanov, Matthew Jackson, Isabel Marcin, Marco Ottaviani, Erkut Ozbay, Patrick Rey, Nicolas Roux, Andrew Schotter, Chris Tyson, Piercarlo Zanchettin, seminar attendants at NYU–CESS, Carlos III, Venice, DICE, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Michigan State, Michigan, Lund, Glasgow, ASSET 2013, Grenoble-Alpes, and workshops at Porto Conte (2013) and Rennes (2014) for their helpful suggestions. We would also like to thank Dominic Land, Nicolas Meier and Maximilian Pohl for excellent assistance in running the experiments. We acknowledge financial support from the Max Planck Society, NYU–NYC, NYU–AD and Universit{\`a} di Padova. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2018 Elsevier Inc.",
year = "2018",
month = may,
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.008",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "109",
pages = "465--483",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
}