EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES FOR FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION: THERE IS NO MEDIAN CONVERGENCE.

Steven J. Brams; Samuel Merrill

doi:10.1287/mnsc.29.8.927

EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES FOR FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION: THERE IS NO MEDIAN CONVERGENCE.

Steven J. Brams, Samuel Merrill

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Final-offer arbitration is modeled as a two-person, zero-sum game of imperfect information, in which the parties are assumed to know the probability distribution of the arbitrator's fair settlements and to make bids in an infinite strategy space that maximize their expected payoffs. Necessary and sufficient conditions for there to be local and global equilibria in pure strategies are derived, and necessary conditions for mixed strategies in a particular case are found.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	927-941
Number of pages	15
Journal	Management Science
Volume	29
Issue number	8
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.29.8.927
State	Published - 1983

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Strategy and Management
Management Science and Operations Research

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EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES FOR FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION: THERE IS NO MEDIAN CONVERGENCE.

Abstract

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