EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES FOR FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION: THERE IS NO MEDIAN CONVERGENCE.

Steven J. Brams, Samuel Merrill

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Final-offer arbitration is modeled as a two-person, zero-sum game of imperfect information, in which the parties are assumed to know the probability distribution of the arbitrator's fair settlements and to make bids in an infinite strategy space that maximize their expected payoffs. Necessary and sufficient conditions for there to be local and global equilibria in pure strategies are derived, and necessary conditions for mixed strategies in a particular case are found.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)927-941
    Number of pages15
    JournalManagement Science
    Volume29
    Issue number8
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1983

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Strategy and Management
    • Management Science and Operations Research

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