Evolutionary games in wireless networks

Hamidou Tembine, Eitan Altman, Rachid El-Azouzi, Yezekael Hayel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We consider a noncooperative interaction among a large population of mobiles that interfere with each other through many local interactions. The first objective of this paper is to extend the evolutionary game framework to allow an arbitrary number of mobiles that are involved in a local interaction. We allow for interactions between mobiles that are not necessarily reciprocal. We study 1) multiple-access control in a slotted Aloha-based wireless network and 2) power control in wideband code-division multiple-access wireless networks. We define and characterize the equilibrium (called evolutionarily stable strategy) for these games and study the influence of wireless channels and pricing on the evolution of dynamics and the equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number5345810
Pages (from-to)634-646
Number of pages13
JournalIEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics
Volume40
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2010

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Keywords

  • Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
  • Evolutionary game
  • Slotted Aloha
  • Wideband code-division multiple access (W-CDMA)

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Software
  • Information Systems
  • Human-Computer Interaction
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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