Exact Implementation

Dilip Abreu; Hitoshi Matsushima

doi:10.1006/jeth.1994.1051

Exact Implementation

Dilip Abreu, Hitoshi Matsushima

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study implementation of social choice functions when the planner can randomize and impose arbitrarily small fines on players. In complete information environments with three or more players, it is shown that any social choice function is exactly implementable in iteratively weakly undominated strategies. The mechanisms used are finite and robust to the order of removal of dominated strategies. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D78, D82.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1-19
Number of pages	19
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	64
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1051
State	Published - Oct 1994

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1006/jeth.1994.1051

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abstract = "We study implementation of social choice functions when the planner can randomize and impose arbitrarily small fines on players. In complete information environments with three or more players, it is shown that any social choice function is exactly implementable in iteratively weakly undominated strategies. The mechanisms used are finite and robust to the order of removal of dominated strategies. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D78, D82.",

author = "Dilip Abreu and Hitoshi Matsushima",

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Exact Implementation

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