Exact Implementation

Dilip Abreu, Hitoshi Matsushima

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    We study implementation of social choice functions when the planner can randomize and impose arbitrarily small fines on players. In complete information environments with three or more players, it is shown that any social choice function is exactly implementable in iteratively weakly undominated strategies. The mechanisms used are finite and robust to the order of removal of dominated strategies. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D78, D82.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1-19
    Number of pages19
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Issue number1
    StatePublished - Oct 1994

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics


    Dive into the research topics of 'Exact Implementation'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this