Execution of provably secure assays on meda biochips to thwart attacks

Tung Che Liang, Krishnendu Chakrabarty, Mohammed Shayan, Ramesh Karri

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Digital microfluidic biochips (DMFBs) have emerged as a promising platform for DNA sequencing, clinical chemistry, and point-of-care diagnostics. Recent research has shown that DMFBs are susceptible to various types of malicious attacks. Defenses proposed thus far only offer probabilistic guarantees of security due to the limitation of on-chip sensor resources. A micro-electrode-dot-array (MEDA) biochip is a next-generation DMFB that enables the sensing of on-chip droplet locations, which are captured in the form of a droplet-location map. We propose a security mechanism that validates assay execution by reconstructing the sequencing graph (i.e., the assay specification) from the droplet-location maps and comparing it against the golden sequencing graph. We prove that there is a unique (one-to-one) mapping from the set of droplet-location maps (over the duration of the assay) to the set of possible sequencing graphs. Any deviation in the droplet-location maps due to an attack is detected by this countermeasure because the resulting derived sequencing graph is not isomorphic to the original sequencing graph. We highlight the strength of the security mechanism by simulating attacks on real-life bioassays.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationASP-DAC 2019 - 24th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages51-57
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9781450360074
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 21 2019
Event24th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference, ASPDAC 2019 - Tokyo, Japan
Duration: Jan 21 2019Jan 24 2019

Other

Other24th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference, ASPDAC 2019
CountryJapan
CityTokyo
Period1/21/191/24/19

Fingerprint

Biochips
Digital microfluidics
Assays
Bioassay
DNA
Specifications
Electrodes
Sensors

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design

Cite this

Liang, T. C., Chakrabarty, K., Shayan, M., & Karri, R. (2019). Execution of provably secure assays on meda biochips to thwart attacks. In ASP-DAC 2019 - 24th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference (pp. 51-57). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1145/3287624.3287697

Execution of provably secure assays on meda biochips to thwart attacks. / Liang, Tung Che; Chakrabarty, Krishnendu; Shayan, Mohammed; Karri, Ramesh.

ASP-DAC 2019 - 24th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. p. 51-57.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Liang, TC, Chakrabarty, K, Shayan, M & Karri, R 2019, Execution of provably secure assays on meda biochips to thwart attacks. in ASP-DAC 2019 - 24th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 51-57, 24th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference, ASPDAC 2019, Tokyo, Japan, 1/21/19. https://doi.org/10.1145/3287624.3287697
Liang TC, Chakrabarty K, Shayan M, Karri R. Execution of provably secure assays on meda biochips to thwart attacks. In ASP-DAC 2019 - 24th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2019. p. 51-57 https://doi.org/10.1145/3287624.3287697
Liang, Tung Che ; Chakrabarty, Krishnendu ; Shayan, Mohammed ; Karri, Ramesh. / Execution of provably secure assays on meda biochips to thwart attacks. ASP-DAC 2019 - 24th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. pp. 51-57
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