TY - GEN
T1 - Execution of provably secure assays on meda biochips to thwart attacks
AU - Liang, Tung Che
AU - Chakrabarty, Krishnendu
AU - Shayan, Mohammed
AU - Karri, Ramesh
N1 - Funding Information:
∗This work was supported in part by the Army Research Office under grant number W911NF-17-1-0320 and the National Science Foundation under grant number CNS-183362.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Association for Computing Machinery.
PY - 2019/1/21
Y1 - 2019/1/21
N2 - Digital microfluidic biochips (DMFBs) have emerged as a promising platform for DNA sequencing, clinical chemistry, and point-of-care diagnostics. Recent research has shown that DMFBs are susceptible to various types of malicious attacks. Defenses proposed thus far only offer probabilistic guarantees of security due to the limitation of on-chip sensor resources. A micro-electrode-dot-array (MEDA) biochip is a next-generation DMFB that enables the sensing of on-chip droplet locations, which are captured in the form of a droplet-location map. We propose a security mechanism that validates assay execution by reconstructing the sequencing graph (i.e., the assay specification) from the droplet-location maps and comparing it against the golden sequencing graph. We prove that there is a unique (one-to-one) mapping from the set of droplet-location maps (over the duration of the assay) to the set of possible sequencing graphs. Any deviation in the droplet-location maps due to an attack is detected by this countermeasure because the resulting derived sequencing graph is not isomorphic to the original sequencing graph. We highlight the strength of the security mechanism by simulating attacks on real-life bioassays.
AB - Digital microfluidic biochips (DMFBs) have emerged as a promising platform for DNA sequencing, clinical chemistry, and point-of-care diagnostics. Recent research has shown that DMFBs are susceptible to various types of malicious attacks. Defenses proposed thus far only offer probabilistic guarantees of security due to the limitation of on-chip sensor resources. A micro-electrode-dot-array (MEDA) biochip is a next-generation DMFB that enables the sensing of on-chip droplet locations, which are captured in the form of a droplet-location map. We propose a security mechanism that validates assay execution by reconstructing the sequencing graph (i.e., the assay specification) from the droplet-location maps and comparing it against the golden sequencing graph. We prove that there is a unique (one-to-one) mapping from the set of droplet-location maps (over the duration of the assay) to the set of possible sequencing graphs. Any deviation in the droplet-location maps due to an attack is detected by this countermeasure because the resulting derived sequencing graph is not isomorphic to the original sequencing graph. We highlight the strength of the security mechanism by simulating attacks on real-life bioassays.
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U2 - 10.1145/3287624.3287697
DO - 10.1145/3287624.3287697
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85061139206
T3 - Proceedings of the Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference, ASP-DAC
SP - 51
EP - 57
BT - ASP-DAC 2019 - 24th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 24th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference, ASPDAC 2019
Y2 - 21 January 2019 through 24 January 2019
ER -