TY - JOUR
T1 - Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames
AU - Abreu, Dilip
PY - 1986/6
Y1 - 1986/6
N2 - General propositions established in Abreu (Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, October 1983) are applied to the analysis of optimal punishments and constrained Pareto optimal paths of symmetric oligopolistic supergames. A remarkably simple 2-dimensional stick-and-carrot characterization of optimal symmetric punishments is obtained. An analogous result holds for the general case of asymmetric punishments, motivating the study of asymmetric Pareto optimal paths. The latter turn out to have a highly non-stationary dynamic structure which sometimes entails intertemporal reversals of relative payoffs between firms.
AB - General propositions established in Abreu (Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, October 1983) are applied to the analysis of optimal punishments and constrained Pareto optimal paths of symmetric oligopolistic supergames. A remarkably simple 2-dimensional stick-and-carrot characterization of optimal symmetric punishments is obtained. An analogous result holds for the general case of asymmetric punishments, motivating the study of asymmetric Pareto optimal paths. The latter turn out to have a highly non-stationary dynamic structure which sometimes entails intertemporal reversals of relative payoffs between firms.
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U2 - 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90025-6
DO - 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90025-6
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:38249039398
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 39
SP - 191
EP - 225
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 1
ER -