Abstract
This chapter describes a mechanism, applicable to two-party disputes, for dividing divisible items fairly. The mechanism, called adjusted winner, provides a way to determine which contested items, which may be either goods or issues, each party wins entirely, and which single good or issue must be divided, to satisfy three properties of fair division: envy-freeness, efficiency, and equitability. The mechanism has been applied to disputes ranging from interpersonal to international. This chapter applies it to the dispute between Israel and Egypt that was settled, under the auspices of US President Jimmy Carter, at Camp David in 1978.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice |
| Subtitle of host publication | Volume 1 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Pages | 868-886 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Volume | 1 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780190469733 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780190469740 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2019 |
Keywords
- Camp David
- adjusted winner
- efficiency
- envy-freeness
- equitability
- fair division
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)