TY - JOUR
T1 - Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences
T2 - Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity
AU - Brams, Steven J.
AU - Fishburn, Peter C.
PY - 2000
Y1 - 2000
N2 - This paper focuses on the fair division of a set of indivisible items between two people when both have the same linear preference order on the items but may have different preferences over subsets of items. Surprisingly, divisions that are envy-free, Pareto-optimal, and ensure that the less well-off person does as well as possible (i.e., are equitable) can often be achieved. Preferences between subsets are assumed to satisfy axioms of qualitative probability without implying the existence of additive utilities, which is treated as a special case. Algorithms that render fair division practicable are proposed, and their vulnerability to strategic manipulation is investigated.
AB - This paper focuses on the fair division of a set of indivisible items between two people when both have the same linear preference order on the items but may have different preferences over subsets of items. Surprisingly, divisions that are envy-free, Pareto-optimal, and ensure that the less well-off person does as well as possible (i.e., are equitable) can often be achieved. Preferences between subsets are assumed to satisfy axioms of qualitative probability without implying the existence of additive utilities, which is treated as a special case. Algorithms that render fair division practicable are proposed, and their vulnerability to strategic manipulation is investigated.
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U2 - 10.1007/s003550050019
DO - 10.1007/s003550050019
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0034394062
SN - 0176-1714
VL - 17
SP - 247
EP - 267
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
IS - 2
ER -