@article{61a569e23c7a494aaf9f02475c94f33e,
title = "Feedback from moral philosophy to cognitive science",
abstract = "A popular argument form uses general theories of cognitive architecture to motivate conclusions about the nature of moral cognition. This paper highlights the possibility for modus tollens reversal of this argument form. If theories of cognitive architecture generate predictions for moral cognition, then tests of moral thinking provide feedback to cognitive science. In certain circumstances, philosophers' introspective attention to their own moral deliberations can provide unique data for these tests. Recognizing the possibility for this sort of feedback helps to illuminate a deep continuity between the disciplines.",
keywords = "Cognitive Science, Ethics, Moral Cognition, Moral Philosophy",
author = "Rini, {Regina A.}",
note = "Funding Information: I owe particular thanks to Ned Block, Linus Huang, Anne Jacobson, Joshua Knobe, Sharon Street, Michael Strevens, Aaron Wilson, and two anonymous reviewers for thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this paper, and to participants in the University of Miami Graduate Conference on Mind and Ethics, and the NYU Thesis Prep Seminar. The argument of this paper has also benefited from the suggestions of Ot{\'a}vio Bueno, Justin Clarke-Doane, Jonny Cottrell, Daniela Dover, Dana Evan, Thomas Nagel, Daniel Robinson, Jeff Sebo, Jon Simon, Michael Slote, Seunghyun Song, and Amie Thomasson. Development of this research benefited from the support of the VolkswagenStiftung{\textquoteright}s European Platform for Life Sciences, Mind Sciences, and the Humanities (grant II/85 063). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2013, {\textcopyright} 2013 Taylor & Francis.",
year = "2015",
month = may,
day = "19",
doi = "10.1080/09515089.2013.864454",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "28",
pages = "569--588",
journal = "Philosophical Psychology",
issn = "0951-5089",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "4",
}