Finite automata play a repeated extensive game

Michele Piccione, Ariel Rubinstein

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This paper analyzes a two-player game in which each player has to choose an automaton (machine) which plays an infinitely repeated extensive game. We assume that the preferences of the player depend both on repeated game payoffs and the number of states of their machine. In contrast to repeated normal form games, it is shown that if the stage-game is an extensive game with perfect information, any Nash equilibrium of the machine game will induce a path consisting of a constant play of a Nash equilibrium of the stage-game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification number: C72.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)160-168
    Number of pages9
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume61
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Oct 1993

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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