Abstract
This paper describes the structure of the Windows registry as it is stored in physical memory. We present tools and techniques that can be used to extract this data directly from memory dumps. We also provide guidelines to aid investigators and experimentally demonstrate the value of our techniques. Finally, we describe a compelling attack that modifies the cached version of the registry without altering the on-disk version. While this attack would be undetectable with conventional on-disk registry analysis techniques, we demonstrate that such malicious modifications are easily detectable by examining memory.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Title of host publication | DFRWS 2008 Annual Conference |
State | Published - 2008 |
Event | 8th Annual Digital Forensic Research Workshop, DFRWS 2008 - Baltimore, MD, United States Duration: Aug 11 2008 → Aug 13 2008 |
Other
Other | 8th Annual Digital Forensic Research Workshop, DFRWS 2008 |
---|---|
Country/Territory | United States |
City | Baltimore, MD |
Period | 8/11/08 → 8/13/08 |
Keywords
- Cached data
- Digital forensics
- Microsoft Windows
- Registry
- Volatile memory
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Information Systems