TY - JOUR
T1 - Free to leave? A welfare analysis of divorce regimes
AU - Fernández, Raquel
AU - Wong, Joyce Cheng
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - During the 1970s, the United States switched from mutual consent to a unilateral divorce regime. Who benefited/lost from this change? We develop a dynamic life cycle model in which agents make consumption, saving, work, and marital-status decisions under a given divorce regime. Calibrating the model to match key moments for the 1940 cohort and conditioning solely on gender, our ex ante welfare analysis finds that women fare better under mutual consent whereas men prefer a unilateral system. Conditioning as well on initial productivity (expected income), we find that the top three quintiles of men and the top two quintiles of women prefer unilateral divorce.
AB - During the 1970s, the United States switched from mutual consent to a unilateral divorce regime. Who benefited/lost from this change? We develop a dynamic life cycle model in which agents make consumption, saving, work, and marital-status decisions under a given divorce regime. Calibrating the model to match key moments for the 1940 cohort and conditioning solely on gender, our ex ante welfare analysis finds that women fare better under mutual consent whereas men prefer a unilateral system. Conditioning as well on initial productivity (expected income), we find that the top three quintiles of men and the top two quintiles of women prefer unilateral divorce.
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U2 - 10.1257/mac.20150293
DO - 10.1257/mac.20150293
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85021408793
SN - 1945-7707
VL - 9
SP - 72
EP - 115
JO - American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
JF - American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
IS - 3
ER -