TY - JOUR
T1 - Game-theoretic methods for robustness, security, and resilience of cyberphysical control systems
T2 - Games-in-games principle for optimal cross-layer resilient control systems
AU - Zhu, Quanyan
AU - Başar, Tamer
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 1991-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2015/2/1
Y1 - 2015/2/1
N2 - Critical infrastructures, such as power grids and transportation systems, are increasingly using open networks for operation. The use of open networks poses many challenges for control systems. The classical design of control systems takes into account modeling uncertainties as well as physical disturbances, providing a multitude of control design methods such as robust control, adaptive control, and stochastic control. With the growing level of integration of control systems with new information technologies, modern control systems face uncertainties not only from the physical world but also from the cybercomponents of the system. The vulnerabilities of the software deployed in the new control system infrastructure will expose the control system to many potential risks and threats from attackers. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities can lead to severe damage as has been reported in various news outlets [1], [2]. More recently, it has been reported in [3] and [4] that a computer worm, Stuxnet, was spread to target Siemens supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems that are configured to control and monitor specific industrial processes.
AB - Critical infrastructures, such as power grids and transportation systems, are increasingly using open networks for operation. The use of open networks poses many challenges for control systems. The classical design of control systems takes into account modeling uncertainties as well as physical disturbances, providing a multitude of control design methods such as robust control, adaptive control, and stochastic control. With the growing level of integration of control systems with new information technologies, modern control systems face uncertainties not only from the physical world but also from the cybercomponents of the system. The vulnerabilities of the software deployed in the new control system infrastructure will expose the control system to many potential risks and threats from attackers. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities can lead to severe damage as has been reported in various news outlets [1], [2]. More recently, it has been reported in [3] and [4] that a computer worm, Stuxnet, was spread to target Siemens supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems that are configured to control and monitor specific industrial processes.
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U2 - 10.1109/MCS.2014.2364710
DO - 10.1109/MCS.2014.2364710
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84921497384
SN - 1066-033X
VL - 35
SP - 46
EP - 65
JO - IEEE Control Systems
JF - IEEE Control Systems
IS - 1
M1 - 7011006
ER -