TY - GEN
T1 - Game Theoretic Modeling of Insider Threats in an Organization
AU - Lalropuia, K. C.
AU - Goyal, Sanjeev
AU - de Soto, Borja Garcia
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - Insider threats have emerged as serious threats to organizations due to the rapid advancement and incorporation of communication technologies. Insider threats incurred significant costs to different organizations. Tackling these threats is a big challenge as insiders can misuse their privilege and their behavior is not known completely. Insiders are mainly motivated by financial gain, espionage, disgruntlement, etc. To address this issue, a great deal of research has been done in the literature on detection and mitigation of the threats. However, the existing work have not investigated properly the important problems such as how various types of people (i.e., honest and trained, honest but untrained in cybersecurity, malicious insiders) evolve in organizations, which type of people would be prevalent and which types would co-exist in the long run. Hence, we propose a novel evolutionary game model to address these problems. Based on the proposed model, we have insights into how malicious insiders and honest people would interact, survive or coexist in the organization.
AB - Insider threats have emerged as serious threats to organizations due to the rapid advancement and incorporation of communication technologies. Insider threats incurred significant costs to different organizations. Tackling these threats is a big challenge as insiders can misuse their privilege and their behavior is not known completely. Insiders are mainly motivated by financial gain, espionage, disgruntlement, etc. To address this issue, a great deal of research has been done in the literature on detection and mitigation of the threats. However, the existing work have not investigated properly the important problems such as how various types of people (i.e., honest and trained, honest but untrained in cybersecurity, malicious insiders) evolve in organizations, which type of people would be prevalent and which types would co-exist in the long run. Hence, we propose a novel evolutionary game model to address these problems. Based on the proposed model, we have insights into how malicious insiders and honest people would interact, survive or coexist in the organization.
KW - Evolutionary game
KW - Insider threats
KW - Security
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85199641077&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85199641077&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-61489-7_12
DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-61489-7_12
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85199641077
SN - 9783031614880
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 188
EP - 192
BT - Applied Cryptography and Network Security Workshops - ACNS 2024 Satellite Workshops, AIBlock, AIHWS, AIoTS, SCI, AAC, SiMLA, LLE, and CIMSS, 2024, Proceedings
A2 - Andreoni, Martin
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
T2 - Satellite Workshops held in parallel with the 22nd International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security, ACNS 2024
Y2 - 5 March 2024 through 8 March 2024
ER -