Games with Procedurally Rational Players

Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    We study interactive situations in which players are boundedly rational. Each player, rather than optimizing given a belief about the other players' behavior, as in the theory of Nash equilibrium, uses the following choice procedure. She first associates one consequence with each of her actions by sampling (literally or virtually) each of her actions once. Then she chooses the action that has the best consequence. We define a notion of equilibrium for such situations and study its properties.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)834-847
    Number of pages14
    JournalAmerican Economic Review
    Volume88
    Issue number4
    StatePublished - Sep 1998

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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