Generalized median voter schemes and committees

Salvador Barberà, Faruk Gul, Ennio Stacchetti

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    We define a multidimensional analogue of a single-peaked preference and generalize the notion of a median voter scheme. Every onto strategy-proof social choice function on a single-peaked domain is a generalized median voter scheme. Since a single-peaked preference can be identified unequivocally with its bliss point, one can view a social choice function as an Arrowian social welfare function. We show that a social choice function is strategy-proof iff, viewed as a social welfare function, it satisfies a monotonicity property. Finally, we investigate strategic decision making in hierarchical committees. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D71.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)262-289
    Number of pages28
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume61
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Dec 1993

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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