Group stability in matching with interdependent values

Archishman Chakraborty; Alessandro Citanna; Michael Ostrovsky

doi:10.1007/s10058-014-0156-3

Group stability in matching with interdependent values

Archishman Chakraborty, Alessandro Citanna, Michael Ostrovsky

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with interdependent valuations and imperfect information held by one side of the market. The other side has common and known preferences over potential mates. In this setting, pairwise stability does not imply group stability: mechanisms that are stable with respect to deviations by pairs of agents may be vulnerable to deviations by groups. We formalize a notion of group stability and construct a “modified serial dictatorship” mechanism that implements group stable matchings. We further discuss the robustness of our notion of stability and examine efficiency properties of modified serial dictatorship.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	3-24
Number of pages	22
Journal	Review of Economic Design
Volume	19
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-014-0156-3
State	Published - Mar 2015

Keywords

Group stability
Interdependent values
Modified serial dictatorship

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Economics, Econometrics and Finance

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10.1007/s10058-014-0156-3

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abstract = "We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with interdependent valuations and imperfect information held by one side of the market. The other side has common and known preferences over potential mates. In this setting, pairwise stability does not imply group stability: mechanisms that are stable with respect to deviations by pairs of agents may be vulnerable to deviations by groups. We formalize a notion of group stability and construct a “modified serial dictatorship” mechanism that implements group stable matchings. We further discuss the robustness of our notion of stability and examine efficiency properties of modified serial dictatorship.",

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AB - We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with interdependent valuations and imperfect information held by one side of the market. The other side has common and known preferences over potential mates. In this setting, pairwise stability does not imply group stability: mechanisms that are stable with respect to deviations by pairs of agents may be vulnerable to deviations by groups. We formalize a notion of group stability and construct a “modified serial dictatorship” mechanism that implements group stable matchings. We further discuss the robustness of our notion of stability and examine efficiency properties of modified serial dictatorship.

KW - Group stability

KW - Interdependent values

KW - Modified serial dictatorship

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Group stability in matching with interdependent values

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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