Hardware security strategies exploiting nanoelectronic circuits

Garrett S. Rose; Jeyavijayan Rajendran; Nathan McDonald; Ramesh Karri; Miodrag Potkonjak; Bryant Wysocki

doi:10.1109/ASPDAC.2013.6509623

Hardware security strategies exploiting nanoelectronic circuits

Garrett S. Rose, Jeyavijayan Rajendran, Nathan McDonald, Ramesh Karri, Miodrag Potkonjak, Bryant Wysocki

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

Hardware security has emerged as an important field of study aimed at mitigating issues such as piracy, counterfeiting, and side channel attacks. One popular solution for such hardware security attacks are physical unclonable functions (PUF) which provide a hardware specific unique signature or identification. The uniqueness of a PUF depends on intrinsic process variations within individual integrated circuits. As process variations become more prevalent due to technology scaling into the nanometer regime, novel nanoelectronic technologies such as memristors become viable options for improved security in emerging integrated circuits. In this paper, we provide an overview of memristor based PUF structures and circuits that illustrate the potential for nanoelectronic hardware security solutions.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	2013 18th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference, ASP-DAC 2013
Pages	368-372
Number of pages	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ASPDAC.2013.6509623
State	Published - 2013
Event	2013 18th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference, ASP-DAC 2013 - Yokohama, Japan Duration: Jan 22 2013 → Jan 25 2013

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference, ASP-DAC

Other

Other	2013 18th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference, ASP-DAC 2013
Country/Territory	Japan
City	Yokohama
Period	1/22/13 → 1/25/13

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Science Applications
Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Access to Document

10.1109/ASPDAC.2013.6509623

Cite this

Rose, G. S., Rajendran, J., McDonald, N., Karri, R., Potkonjak, M., & Wysocki, B. (2013). Hardware security strategies exploiting nanoelectronic circuits. In 2013 18th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference, ASP-DAC 2013 (pp. 368-372). Article 6509623 (Proceedings of the Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference, ASP-DAC). https://doi.org/10.1109/ASPDAC.2013.6509623

Hardware security strategies exploiting nanoelectronic circuits. / Rose, Garrett S.; Rajendran, Jeyavijayan; McDonald, Nathan et al.
2013 18th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference, ASP-DAC 2013. 2013. p. 368-372 6509623 (Proceedings of the Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference, ASP-DAC).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Rose, GS, Rajendran, J, McDonald, N, Karri, R, Potkonjak, M & Wysocki, B 2013, Hardware security strategies exploiting nanoelectronic circuits. in 2013 18th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference, ASP-DAC 2013., 6509623, Proceedings of the Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference, ASP-DAC, pp. 368-372, 2013 18th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference, ASP-DAC 2013, Yokohama, Japan, 1/22/13. https://doi.org/10.1109/ASPDAC.2013.6509623

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abstract = "Hardware security has emerged as an important field of study aimed at mitigating issues such as piracy, counterfeiting, and side channel attacks. One popular solution for such hardware security attacks are physical unclonable functions (PUF) which provide a hardware specific unique signature or identification. The uniqueness of a PUF depends on intrinsic process variations within individual integrated circuits. As process variations become more prevalent due to technology scaling into the nanometer regime, novel nanoelectronic technologies such as memristors become viable options for improved security in emerging integrated circuits. In this paper, we provide an overview of memristor based PUF structures and circuits that illustrate the potential for nanoelectronic hardware security solutions.",

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AB - Hardware security has emerged as an important field of study aimed at mitigating issues such as piracy, counterfeiting, and side channel attacks. One popular solution for such hardware security attacks are physical unclonable functions (PUF) which provide a hardware specific unique signature or identification. The uniqueness of a PUF depends on intrinsic process variations within individual integrated circuits. As process variations become more prevalent due to technology scaling into the nanometer regime, novel nanoelectronic technologies such as memristors become viable options for improved security in emerging integrated circuits. In this paper, we provide an overview of memristor based PUF structures and circuits that illustrate the potential for nanoelectronic hardware security solutions.

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Hardware security strategies exploiting nanoelectronic circuits

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