Heterogeneous learning in zero-sum stochastic games with incomplete information

Quanyan Zhu, Hamidou Tembine, Tamer Başar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution


Learning algorithms are essential for the applications of game theory in a networking environment. In dynamic and decentralized settings where the traffic, topology and channel states may vary over time and the communication between agents is impractical, it is important to formulate and study games of incomplete information and fully distributed learning algorithms which for each agent requires a minimal amount of information regarding the remaining agents. In this paper, we address this major challenge and introduce heterogeneous learning schemes in which each agent adopts a distinct learning pattern in the context of games with incomplete information. We use stochastic approximation techniques to show that the heterogeneous learning schemes can be studied in terms of their deterministic ordinary differential equation (ODE) counterparts. Depending on the learning rates of the players, these ODEs could be different from the standard replicator dynamics, (myopic) best response (BR) dynamics, logit dynamics, and fictitious play dynamics. We apply the results to a class of security games in which the attacker and the defender adopt different learning schemes due to differences in their rationality levels and the information they acquire.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2010 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9781424477456
StatePublished - 2010
Event49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010 - Atlanta, United States
Duration: Dec 15 2010Dec 17 2010

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
ISSN (Print)0743-1546
ISSN (Electronic)2576-2370


Conference49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010
Country/TerritoryUnited States

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization


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