Hidden symmetries and focal points

Carlos Alós-Ferrer; Christoph Kuzmics

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.003

Hidden symmetries and focal points

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Christoph Kuzmics

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We provide a general formal framework to define and analyze the concepts of focal points and frames for normal form games. The information provided by a frame is captured by a symmetry structure which is consistent with the payoff structure of the game. The set of symmetry structures has itself a clear structure (a lattice). Focal points are strategy profiles which respect the symmetry structure and are chosen according to some meta-norm, which is not particular to the framed game at hand.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	226-258
Number of pages	33
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	148
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.003
State	Published - Jan 2013

Keywords

Focal points
Frames
Nash equilibria
Symmetry

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.003

Cite this

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title = "Hidden symmetries and focal points",

abstract = "We provide a general formal framework to define and analyze the concepts of focal points and frames for normal form games. The information provided by a frame is captured by a symmetry structure which is consistent with the payoff structure of the game. The set of symmetry structures has itself a clear structure (a lattice). Focal points are strategy profiles which respect the symmetry structure and are chosen according to some meta-norm, which is not particular to the framed game at hand.",

keywords = "Focal points, Frames, Nash equilibria, Symmetry",

author = "Carlos Al{\'o}s-Ferrer and Christoph Kuzmics",

note = "Funding Information: We would like to thank Andreas Blume, Vincent Crawford, P{\'e}ter Es{\"o}, Michael Greinecker, Hans Haller, Maarten Janssen, Andrew McLennan, Roger Myerson, Larry Samuelson, Bill Sandholm, Itai Sher, Jonathan Weinstein, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants in Berlin, Cologne, Karlsruhe, Maastricht, Northwestern University, Paris, Vancouver, and Vienna for helpful comments. Financial support from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under Project P18141-G09 is gratefully acknowledged. Copyright: Copyright 2013 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",

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doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.003",

language = "English (US)",

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N2 - We provide a general formal framework to define and analyze the concepts of focal points and frames for normal form games. The information provided by a frame is captured by a symmetry structure which is consistent with the payoff structure of the game. The set of symmetry structures has itself a clear structure (a lattice). Focal points are strategy profiles which respect the symmetry structure and are chosen according to some meta-norm, which is not particular to the framed game at hand.

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KW - Nash equilibria

KW - Symmetry

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Hidden symmetries and focal points

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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