Abstract
"Beauty contests" are well-studied, dominance-solvable games that generate two interesting results. First, most behavior does not conform to the unique Nash equilibrium. Second, there is considerable unexplained heterogeneity in behavior. In this work, we explore the relationship between beauty contest behavior and cognitive ability. We find that subjects with high cognitive ability exhibit behavior that is closer to the Nash equilibrium.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 171-175 |
Number of pages | 5 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
Volume | 72 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Oct 2009 |
Keywords
- Beauty contests
- Cognitive ability
- Experimental economics
- Rationality
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management