Hostile Blockchain Takeovers

Joseph Bonneau

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Most research modelling Bitcoin-style decentralised consensus protocols has assumed profit-motivated participants. Complementary to this analysis, we revisit the notion of attackers with an extrinsic motivation to disrupt the consensus process (Goldfinger attacks). We outline several routes for obtaining a majority of decision-making power in the consensus protocol (a hostile takeover). Our analysis suggests several fundamental differences between proof-of-work and proof-of-stake systems in the face of such an adversary.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationFinancial Cryptography and Data Security - FC 2018 International Workshops, BITCOIN, VOTING, and WTSC, Revised Selected Papers
EditorsAndrea Bracciali, Aviv Zohar, Jeremy Clark, Massimiliano Sala, Ittay Eyal, Vanessa Teague, Federico Pintore
PublisherSpringer-Verlag
Pages92-100
Number of pages9
ISBN (Print)9783662588192
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019
Event22nd International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2018 - Nieuwpoort, Netherlands
Duration: Feb 26 2018Mar 2 2018

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume10958 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference22nd International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2018
CountryNetherlands
CityNieuwpoort
Period2/26/183/2/18

Fingerprint

Profitability
Decision making
Decentralized
Profit
Decision Making
Attack
Modeling
Style

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Bonneau, J. (2019). Hostile Blockchain Takeovers. In A. Bracciali, A. Zohar, J. Clark, M. Sala, I. Eyal, V. Teague, & F. Pintore (Eds.), Financial Cryptography and Data Security - FC 2018 International Workshops, BITCOIN, VOTING, and WTSC, Revised Selected Papers (pp. 92-100). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 10958 LNCS). Springer-Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58820-8_7

Hostile Blockchain Takeovers. / Bonneau, Joseph.

Financial Cryptography and Data Security - FC 2018 International Workshops, BITCOIN, VOTING, and WTSC, Revised Selected Papers. ed. / Andrea Bracciali; Aviv Zohar; Jeremy Clark; Massimiliano Sala; Ittay Eyal; Vanessa Teague; Federico Pintore. Springer-Verlag, 2019. p. 92-100 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 10958 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Bonneau, J 2019, Hostile Blockchain Takeovers. in A Bracciali, A Zohar, J Clark, M Sala, I Eyal, V Teague & F Pintore (eds), Financial Cryptography and Data Security - FC 2018 International Workshops, BITCOIN, VOTING, and WTSC, Revised Selected Papers. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 10958 LNCS, Springer-Verlag, pp. 92-100, 22nd International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2018, Nieuwpoort, Netherlands, 2/26/18. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58820-8_7
Bonneau J. Hostile Blockchain Takeovers. In Bracciali A, Zohar A, Clark J, Sala M, Eyal I, Teague V, Pintore F, editors, Financial Cryptography and Data Security - FC 2018 International Workshops, BITCOIN, VOTING, and WTSC, Revised Selected Papers. Springer-Verlag. 2019. p. 92-100. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58820-8_7
Bonneau, Joseph. / Hostile Blockchain Takeovers. Financial Cryptography and Data Security - FC 2018 International Workshops, BITCOIN, VOTING, and WTSC, Revised Selected Papers. editor / Andrea Bracciali ; Aviv Zohar ; Jeremy Clark ; Massimiliano Sala ; Ittay Eyal ; Vanessa Teague ; Federico Pintore. Springer-Verlag, 2019. pp. 92-100 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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