How Robust Are Probabilistic Models of Higher-Level Cognition?

Gary F. Marcus, Ernest Davis

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

An increasingly popular theory holds that the mind should be viewed as a near-optimal or rational engine of probabilistic inference, in domains as diverse as word learning, pragmatics, naive physics, and predictions of the future. We argue that this view, often identified with Bayesian models of inference, is markedly less promising than widely believed, and is undermined by post hoc practices that merit wholesale reevaluation. We also show that the common equation between probabilistic and rational or optimal is not justified.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2351-2360
Number of pages10
JournalPsychological Science
Volume24
Issue number12
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2013

Keywords

  • Bayesian models
  • cognition(s)
  • optimality

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Psychology(all)

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