Abstract
The gift-exchange game is a form of sequential prisoner's dilemma, developed by Fehr et al. (1993), and popularized in a series of papers by Ernst Fehr and co-authors. While the European studies typically feature a high degree of gift exchange, the few U.S. studies provide some conflicting results. We find that the degree of gift exchange is surprisingly sensitive to an apparently innocuous change-whether or not a comprehensive payoff table is provided in the instructions. We also find significant and substantial time trends in responder behavior.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 189-205 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | Experimental Economics |
Volume | 7 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jun 2004 |
Keywords
- Framing
- Gift exchange
- Robustness
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)