Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models

Hervé Crès, M. Utku Ünver

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the 'worst-case' scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super-majority rate as high as 1 - 1/(n+1) is adopted. In this paper we assume that a lower d-dimensional (d < n) linear map spans the possible candidates' platforms. These d 'ideological' dimensions imply some linkages between the n political issues. We randomize over these linkages and show that there almost surely exists a 50%-majority equilibria in the above worst-case scenario, when n grows to infinity. Moreover, the equilibrium is the mean voter.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)431-444
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Theoretical Politics
Volume22
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2010

Keywords

  • ideology
  • mean voter theorem
  • spatial voting
  • super majority

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

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