TY - JOUR
T1 - If you cannot get your friends elected, lobby your enemies
AU - Felli, Leonardo
AU - Merlo, Antonio
PY - 2007/4
Y1 - 2007/4
N2 - We incorporate campaign contributions in the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying of Felli and Merlo (2006). In equilibrium, lobbies contribute to the electoral campaign of candidates whose policy preferences are aligned with their own. In the event that their preferred candidate does not win the election, lobbies also transfer resources to elected politicians with opposed preferences to induce policy compromise. On the other hand, lobbies never make post electoral transfers to winning candidates whose electoral campaign they supported.
AB - We incorporate campaign contributions in the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying of Felli and Merlo (2006). In equilibrium, lobbies contribute to the electoral campaign of candidates whose policy preferences are aligned with their own. In the event that their preferred candidate does not win the election, lobbies also transfer resources to elected politicians with opposed preferences to induce policy compromise. On the other hand, lobbies never make post electoral transfers to winning candidates whose electoral campaign they supported.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=36749068315&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=36749068315&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1162/jeea.2007.5.2-3.624
DO - 10.1162/jeea.2007.5.2-3.624
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:36749068315
VL - 5
SP - 624
EP - 635
JO - Journal of the European Economic Association
JF - Journal of the European Economic Association
SN - 1542-4774
IS - 2-3
ER -