If you cannot get your friends elected, lobby your enemies

Leonardo Felli, Antonio Merlo

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    We incorporate campaign contributions in the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying of Felli and Merlo (2006). In equilibrium, lobbies contribute to the electoral campaign of candidates whose policy preferences are aligned with their own. In the event that their preferred candidate does not win the election, lobbies also transfer resources to elected politicians with opposed preferences to induce policy compromise. On the other hand, lobbies never make post electoral transfers to winning candidates whose electoral campaign they supported.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)624-635
    Number of pages12
    JournalJournal of the European Economic Association
    Issue number2-3
    StatePublished - Apr 2007

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • General Economics, Econometrics and Finance


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