Abstract
We incorporate campaign contributions in the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying of Felli and Merlo (2006). In equilibrium, lobbies contribute to the electoral campaign of candidates whose policy preferences are aligned with their own. In the event that their preferred candidate does not win the election, lobbies also transfer resources to elected politicians with opposed preferences to induce policy compromise. On the other hand, lobbies never make post electoral transfers to winning candidates whose electoral campaign they supported.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 624-635 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Journal of the European Economic Association |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue number | 2-3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Apr 2007 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
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Felli, L., & Merlo, A. (2007). If you cannot get your friends elected, lobby your enemies. Journal of the European Economic Association, 5(2-3), 624-635. https://doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2007.5.2-3.624