If you cannot get your friends elected, lobby your enemies

Leonardo Felli; Antonio Merlo

doi:10.1162/jeea.2007.5.2-3.624

If you cannot get your friends elected, lobby your enemies

Leonardo Felli, Antonio Merlo

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We incorporate campaign contributions in the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying of Felli and Merlo (2006). In equilibrium, lobbies contribute to the electoral campaign of candidates whose policy preferences are aligned with their own. In the event that their preferred candidate does not win the election, lobbies also transfer resources to elected politicians with opposed preferences to induce policy compromise. On the other hand, lobbies never make post electoral transfers to winning candidates whose electoral campaign they supported.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	624-635
Number of pages	12
Journal	Journal of the European Economic Association
Volume	5
Issue number	2-3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2007.5.2-3.624
State	Published - Apr 2007

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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abstract = "We incorporate campaign contributions in the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying of Felli and Merlo (2006). In equilibrium, lobbies contribute to the electoral campaign of candidates whose policy preferences are aligned with their own. In the event that their preferred candidate does not win the election, lobbies also transfer resources to elected politicians with opposed preferences to induce policy compromise. On the other hand, lobbies never make post electoral transfers to winning candidates whose electoral campaign they supported.",

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