Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Simon Weidenholzer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We consider minimum-effort games played in an arbitrary network. For a family of imitation behavioral rules, including Imitate the Best and the Proportional Imitation Rule, we show that inefficient conventions arise independently of the interaction structure, if information is limited to the interaction neighborhoods. In the presence of information spillovers, we provide a condition on the network structure that guarantees the emergence of efficient conventions. In contrast, if this condition is violated we will observe inefficient conventions, even in the presence of information spillovers.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)397-411
Number of pages15
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
StatePublished - Sep 2014


  • Imitation
  • Learning
  • Local interactions
  • Minimum effort games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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