Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency

Carlos Alós-Ferrer; Simon Weidenholzer

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2006.04.006

Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Simon Weidenholzer

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We consider a circular city model as in Ellison [Ellison, G., 1993. Learning, local interaction, and coordination, Econometrica 61, 1047-1071], where agents follow imitation rules rather than myopic best-response. If interactions are neither global nor limited to the immediate neighbors, payoff-efficient equilibria, and not risk-dominant ones, can be uniquely selected.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	163-168
Number of pages	6
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	93
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.04.006
State	Published - Nov 2006

Keywords

Coordination games
Learning
Local interactions
Mutation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2006.04.006

Cite this

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title = "Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency",

abstract = "We consider a circular city model as in Ellison [Ellison, G., 1993. Learning, local interaction, and coordination, Econometrica 61, 1047-1071], where agents follow imitation rules rather than myopic best-response. If interactions are neither global nor limited to the immediate neighbors, payoff-efficient equilibria, and not risk-dominant ones, can be uniquely selected.",

keywords = "Coordination games, Learning, Local interactions, Mutation",

author = "Carlos Al{\'o}s-Ferrer and Simon Weidenholzer",

note = "Funding Information: The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under Project P18141-G09.",

year = "2006",

month = nov,

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2006.04.006",

language = "English (US)",

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AU - Weidenholzer, Simon

N1 - Funding Information: The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under Project P18141-G09.

PY - 2006/11

Y1 - 2006/11

N2 - We consider a circular city model as in Ellison [Ellison, G., 1993. Learning, local interaction, and coordination, Econometrica 61, 1047-1071], where agents follow imitation rules rather than myopic best-response. If interactions are neither global nor limited to the immediate neighbors, payoff-efficient equilibria, and not risk-dominant ones, can be uniquely selected.

AB - We consider a circular city model as in Ellison [Ellison, G., 1993. Learning, local interaction, and coordination, Econometrica 61, 1047-1071], where agents follow imitation rules rather than myopic best-response. If interactions are neither global nor limited to the immediate neighbors, payoff-efficient equilibria, and not risk-dominant ones, can be uniquely selected.

KW - Coordination games

KW - Learning

KW - Local interactions

KW - Mutation

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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ER -

Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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