Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Simon Weidenholzer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We consider a circular city model as in Ellison [Ellison, G., 1993. Learning, local interaction, and coordination, Econometrica 61, 1047-1071], where agents follow imitation rules rather than myopic best-response. If interactions are neither global nor limited to the immediate neighbors, payoff-efficient equilibria, and not risk-dominant ones, can be uniquely selected.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)163-168
Number of pages6
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume93
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2006

Keywords

  • Coordination games
  • Learning
  • Local interactions
  • Mutation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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