TY - JOUR
T1 - Incumbents' interests and gender quotas
AU - Fréchette, Guillaume R.
AU - Maniquet, Francois
AU - Morelli, Massimo
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2011 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2008/10
Y1 - 2008/10
N2 - The introduction of mandatory gender quotas in party lists is a reform that many countries have recently adopted or have been considering. The electoral system affects the incumbents' incentives to make such reforms, their details, and their effectiveness. We show that male incumbents can actually expect an increased incumbency advantage when gender quotas are introduced, if they are elected through single-member district majority rule. On the other hand, no expectation of male advantage can reduce the incumbents' fear of being replaced if they are elected through closed-list proportional representation. As France has both electoral systems, we validate the above argument using a formal model of constitutional design as well as an empirical analysis of the legislative elections in France, displaying the existence of male bias in the last three elections. We also show that parity may have Assembly composition effects and policy effects that vary with the electoral system.
AB - The introduction of mandatory gender quotas in party lists is a reform that many countries have recently adopted or have been considering. The electoral system affects the incumbents' incentives to make such reforms, their details, and their effectiveness. We show that male incumbents can actually expect an increased incumbency advantage when gender quotas are introduced, if they are elected through single-member district majority rule. On the other hand, no expectation of male advantage can reduce the incumbents' fear of being replaced if they are elected through closed-list proportional representation. As France has both electoral systems, we validate the above argument using a formal model of constitutional design as well as an empirical analysis of the legislative elections in France, displaying the existence of male bias in the last three elections. We also show that parity may have Assembly composition effects and policy effects that vary with the electoral system.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=53149139003&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=53149139003&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00349.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00349.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:53149139003
VL - 52
SP - 891
EP - 909
JO - American Journal of Political Science
JF - American Journal of Political Science
SN - 0092-5853
IS - 4
ER -