Inequality averse collective choice

Efe A. Ok

doi:10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00041-4

Inequality averse collective choice

Efe A. Ok

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The Lorenz-Pareto optimal frontier of a collective choice problem identifies a subset of all Pareto optimal outcomes which are not inegalitarian according to the Lorenz criterion. An inequality averse choice function must thus be Lorenz-Pareto optimal in the sense that it should never 'choose' an outcome outside the Lorenz-Pareto frontier of any choice problem. We study the basic properties of the Lorenz-Pareto optimal choice functions and, in particular, obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizability and representability of such choice functions. Several applications to the theory of Nash bargaining are also outlined.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	301-321
Number of pages	21
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	30
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00041-4
State	Published - Oct 1998

Keywords

Axiomatic bargaining theory
C78
D71
Egalitarian collective choice
Rational choice

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Applied Mathematics

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10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00041-4

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KW - Rational choice

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Inequality averse collective choice

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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