Inequality averse collective choice

Efe A. Ok

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    The Lorenz-Pareto optimal frontier of a collective choice problem identifies a subset of all Pareto optimal outcomes which are not inegalitarian according to the Lorenz criterion. An inequality averse choice function must thus be Lorenz-Pareto optimal in the sense that it should never 'choose' an outcome outside the Lorenz-Pareto frontier of any choice problem. We study the basic properties of the Lorenz-Pareto optimal choice functions and, in particular, obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizability and representability of such choice functions. Several applications to the theory of Nash bargaining are also outlined.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)301-321
    Number of pages21
    JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
    Volume30
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Oct 1998

    Keywords

    • Axiomatic bargaining theory
    • C78
    • D71
    • Egalitarian collective choice
    • Rational choice

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Applied Mathematics

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