TY - JOUR
T1 - Influence of Marriage on Women’s Participation in Medicine
T2 - The Case of Doctor Brides of Pakistan
AU - Masood, Ayesha
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgments The research for the present paper was supported by grants from Wenner-Gren Foundation, Arizona State University and American Institute of Pakistan Studies.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2019/1/1
Y1 - 2019/1/1
N2 - Despite the difficulties women in Pakistan face in their access to education, their numbers have been increasing consistently in medical colleges. However, most of the women medical graduates do not go on to practice medicine after graduation. One of the reasons suggested by Pakistani media and society for this increase in the number of women medical graduates is the desirability of women doctors in Pakistan’s marriage market. Based on an ethnographic study of Pakistani women doctors, I examine why women doctors are considered desirable as spouses and how this influences women’s access to medical education. I found that women doctors are valued as marital partners because of the status granted to them by their academic credentials, chaste educational experience, and potential to contribute to family income. Because of the value of medical education in marriage, parents are more willing to invest in their daughters’ education, facilitating women’s access to medical education. I also found that, as a way of bargaining with the patriarchy, women doctors accept the social norms of arranged marriage because it allows them access to professional education, economic opportunities, and a better bargaining position in the marriage market. Overall, I found that, unless underlying patriarchal norms are addressed, potentially empowering projects like women’s education will be co-opted by the existing structures of domination. I also discuss potential implications for changing marriage patterns and increasing representation of women in Pakistan’s medical workforce.
AB - Despite the difficulties women in Pakistan face in their access to education, their numbers have been increasing consistently in medical colleges. However, most of the women medical graduates do not go on to practice medicine after graduation. One of the reasons suggested by Pakistani media and society for this increase in the number of women medical graduates is the desirability of women doctors in Pakistan’s marriage market. Based on an ethnographic study of Pakistani women doctors, I examine why women doctors are considered desirable as spouses and how this influences women’s access to medical education. I found that women doctors are valued as marital partners because of the status granted to them by their academic credentials, chaste educational experience, and potential to contribute to family income. Because of the value of medical education in marriage, parents are more willing to invest in their daughters’ education, facilitating women’s access to medical education. I also found that, as a way of bargaining with the patriarchy, women doctors accept the social norms of arranged marriage because it allows them access to professional education, economic opportunities, and a better bargaining position in the marriage market. Overall, I found that, unless underlying patriarchal norms are addressed, potentially empowering projects like women’s education will be co-opted by the existing structures of domination. I also discuss potential implications for changing marriage patterns and increasing representation of women in Pakistan’s medical workforce.
KW - Engineering and mathematics
KW - Gender gap
KW - Marriage and family measures
KW - Muslim women
KW - Technology
KW - Women in science
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U2 - 10.1007/s11199-018-0909-5
DO - 10.1007/s11199-018-0909-5
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85043687351
SN - 0360-0025
VL - 80
SP - 105
EP - 122
JO - Sex Roles
JF - Sex Roles
IS - 1-2
ER -