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Informal insurance, enforcement constraints, and group formation
Garance Genicot, Debraj Ray
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Keyphrases
Group Formation
100%
Informal Insurance
100%
Risk-sharing Agreements
100%
Enforcement Constraints
100%
Formal Insurance
100%
Poverty
50%
Labor Market
50%
Lack of Access
50%
Developing Countries
50%
Mirror Image
50%
Insurance
50%
Uphold
50%
Attendants
50%
Moral Hazard
50%
Information Asymmetry
50%
Risk Sharing
50%
Mutual Insurance
50%
Village Community
50%
Continuous Participation Intention
50%
Implicit Promises
50%
Formal Credit
50%
Agricultural Production
50%
Consumption Smoothing
50%
Court of Law
50%
Market Production
50%
Informal Arrangements
50%
Extreme Dependence
50%
Enforceability
50%
Incentive Constraints
50%
Rosenzweig
50%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Risk-Sharing
100%
Incentives
50%
Developing Countries
50%
Labor Market
50%
Moral Hazard
50%
Risk Management
50%