Abstract
We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our main result identifies a property of information—the betweenness property—that is both necessary and sufficient for information aggregation. The characterization provides novel predictions about equilibrium prices in complex, multidimensional environments.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 161-196 |
Number of pages | 36 |
Journal | Theoretical Economics |
Volume | 16 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 2021 |
Keywords
- Auctions
- C72
- D44
- D82
- D83
- G14
- betweenness
- competitive markets
- information aggregation
- rational expectations equilibrium
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Economics, Econometrics and Finance