Information aggregation in competitive markets

Lucas Siga, Maximilian Mihm

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our main result identifies a property of information—the betweenness property—that is both necessary and sufficient for information aggregation. The characterization provides novel predictions about equilibrium prices in complex, multidimensional environments.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)161-196
Number of pages36
JournalTheoretical Economics
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2021


  • Auctions
  • C72
  • D44
  • D82
  • D83
  • G14
  • betweenness
  • competitive markets
  • information aggregation
  • rational expectations equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Economics, Econometrics and Finance


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