Abstract
A series of formal models compares how institutions affect the distribution of trade protection. Specifically, we consider how the level of party discipline within majoritarian political systems affects the political incentives for leaders to supply protection to geographically distributed industries. In plurality systems with high party discipline, such as Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, industries concentrated in marginal electoral districts receive the most protection. In the United States, a plurality system with low party discipline, large industries geographically dispersed over many electoral districts receive the most favorable protection.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 119-143 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | International Interactions |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1997 |
Keywords
- Endogenous tariff theory
- Party discipline
- Political institutions
- Protectionism
- Tariffs
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Political Science and International Relations