Abstract
We study the strategies used by experimental subjects in repeated sequential prisoners’ dilemma games to identify the underlying motivations behind instrumental reciprocity, that is, reciprocation of cooperation only if there is future interaction. Importantly, we designed the games so that instrumental reciprocity is a mistake for payoff-maximizing individuals irrespective of their beliefs. We find that, despite the fact that instrumental reciprocity is suboptimal, it is one of the most frequently used cooperative strategies. Moreover, although the use of instrumental reciprocity is sensitive to the costs of deviating from the payoff-maximizing strategy, these costs alone cannot explain the high frequency with which subjects choose to reciprocate instrumentally.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Article number | 66 |
| Journal | Games |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Sep 6 2018 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Statistics and Probability
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
- Applied Mathematics
Cite this
Instrumental reciprocity as an error. / Reuben, Ernesto; Suetens, Sigrid.
In: Games, Vol. 9, No. 3, 66, 06.09.2018.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Instrumental reciprocity as an error
AU - Reuben, Ernesto
AU - Suetens, Sigrid
PY - 2018/9/6
Y1 - 2018/9/6
N2 - We study the strategies used by experimental subjects in repeated sequential prisoners’ dilemma games to identify the underlying motivations behind instrumental reciprocity, that is, reciprocation of cooperation only if there is future interaction. Importantly, we designed the games so that instrumental reciprocity is a mistake for payoff-maximizing individuals irrespective of their beliefs. We find that, despite the fact that instrumental reciprocity is suboptimal, it is one of the most frequently used cooperative strategies. Moreover, although the use of instrumental reciprocity is sensitive to the costs of deviating from the payoff-maximizing strategy, these costs alone cannot explain the high frequency with which subjects choose to reciprocate instrumentally.
AB - We study the strategies used by experimental subjects in repeated sequential prisoners’ dilemma games to identify the underlying motivations behind instrumental reciprocity, that is, reciprocation of cooperation only if there is future interaction. Importantly, we designed the games so that instrumental reciprocity is a mistake for payoff-maximizing individuals irrespective of their beliefs. We find that, despite the fact that instrumental reciprocity is suboptimal, it is one of the most frequently used cooperative strategies. Moreover, although the use of instrumental reciprocity is sensitive to the costs of deviating from the payoff-maximizing strategy, these costs alone cannot explain the high frequency with which subjects choose to reciprocate instrumentally.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85055586106&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85055586106&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.3390/g9030066
DO - 10.3390/g9030066
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85055586106
VL - 9
JO - Games
JF - Games
SN - 2073-4336
IS - 3
M1 - 66
ER -