Mitchell Atkinson

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter


Here, I build up a reading of the phenomenological concept of intentionality, using my own examples. The chapter aims to introduce a non-phenomenological reader to the concept of intentionality, while at the same time casting light on the problem of limiting our methodologies to the analysis of linguistic reference. It is shown that reference and intentionality are clearly different functions of consciousness. In the discussion of reference, I discuss Ruth Barcan Marcus’ work on intensional languages, as an example of the limitations of referential approaches.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationContributions To Phenomenology
PublisherSpringer Nature
Number of pages19
StatePublished - 2023

Publication series

NameContributions To Phenomenology
ISSN (Print)0923-9545
ISSN (Electronic)2215-1915


  • Aboutness
  • Flint
  • Husserl
  • Identity
  • Intentionality
  • Reference
  • Ruth Barcan Marcus

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • History and Philosophy of Science


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