Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: An experimental study

Luis Cabral; Erkut Y. Ozbay; Andrew Schotter

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.001

Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: An experimental study

Luis Cabral, Erkut Y. Ozbay, Andrew Schotter

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In the context of an indefinitely repeated veto game, we devise an experiment to distinguish between alternative explanations of generous behavior (accepting negative payoffs): altruism, intrinsic backward-looking reciprocity, and instrumental forward-looking reciprocity. Our results are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that observed sacrifices are motivated by equilibrium selfish, forward-looking reciprocal behavior although we find a more subtle way in which past kindness affects behavior.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	100-121
Number of pages	22
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	87
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.001
State	Published - Sep 2014

Keywords

Indefinitely repeated games
Reciprocity
Veto game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.001

Cite this

@article{214d8548156b461cab102778c7dde70a,

title = "Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: An experimental study",

abstract = "In the context of an indefinitely repeated veto game, we devise an experiment to distinguish between alternative explanations of generous behavior (accepting negative payoffs): altruism, intrinsic backward-looking reciprocity, and instrumental forward-looking reciprocity. Our results are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that observed sacrifices are motivated by equilibrium selfish, forward-looking reciprocal behavior although we find a more subtle way in which past kindness affects behavior.",

keywords = "Indefinitely repeated games, Reciprocity, Veto game",

author = "Luis Cabral and Ozbay, {Erkut Y.} and Andrew Schotter",

note = "Funding Information: We acknowledge the helpful comments made by Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Guillaume Fr{\'e}chette, Alistair Wilson, Drew Fudenberg, Giancarlo Spagnolo as well as the seminar participants at the CESS Experimental Economics Seminar, the Nordic Behavioral and Experimental Economics Conference, the Mannheim Experimental Economics Conference and the University of Heidelberg, Drexel University, ITAM and University of Montreal. Research support by the Center for Experimental Social Science is gratefully acknowledged. ",

year = "2014",

month = sep,

doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.001",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "87",

pages = "100--121",

journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",

issn = "0899-8256",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity

T2 - An experimental study

AU - Cabral, Luis

AU - Ozbay, Erkut Y.

AU - Schotter, Andrew

N1 - Funding Information: We acknowledge the helpful comments made by Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Guillaume Fréchette, Alistair Wilson, Drew Fudenberg, Giancarlo Spagnolo as well as the seminar participants at the CESS Experimental Economics Seminar, the Nordic Behavioral and Experimental Economics Conference, the Mannheim Experimental Economics Conference and the University of Heidelberg, Drexel University, ITAM and University of Montreal. Research support by the Center for Experimental Social Science is gratefully acknowledged.

PY - 2014/9

Y1 - 2014/9

N2 - In the context of an indefinitely repeated veto game, we devise an experiment to distinguish between alternative explanations of generous behavior (accepting negative payoffs): altruism, intrinsic backward-looking reciprocity, and instrumental forward-looking reciprocity. Our results are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that observed sacrifices are motivated by equilibrium selfish, forward-looking reciprocal behavior although we find a more subtle way in which past kindness affects behavior.

AB - In the context of an indefinitely repeated veto game, we devise an experiment to distinguish between alternative explanations of generous behavior (accepting negative payoffs): altruism, intrinsic backward-looking reciprocity, and instrumental forward-looking reciprocity. Our results are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that observed sacrifices are motivated by equilibrium selfish, forward-looking reciprocal behavior although we find a more subtle way in which past kindness affects behavior.

KW - Indefinitely repeated games

KW - Reciprocity

KW - Veto game

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84901466578&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84901466578&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.001

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.001

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84901466578

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 87

SP - 100

EP - 121

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -

Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: An experimental study

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this