TY - GEN
T1 - Invariance-based concurrent error detection for advanced encryption standard
AU - Guo, Xiaofei
AU - Karri, Ramesh
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2012 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - Naturally occurring and maliciously injected faults reduce the reliability of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and may leak confidential information. We developed an invariance-based concurrent error detection (CED) scheme which is independent of the implementation of AES encryption/decryption. Additionally, we improve the security of our scheme with Randomized CED Round Insertion and adaptive checking. Experimental results show that the invariance-based CED scheme detects all single-bit, all single-byte fault, and 99.99999997% of burst faults. The area and delay overheads of this scheme are compared with those of previously reported CED schemes on two Xilinx Virtex FPGAs. The hardware overhead is in the 13.2-27.3% range and the throughput is between 1.8-42.2Gbps depending on the AES architecture, FPGA family, and the detection latency. One can implement our scheme in many ways; designers can trade off performance, reliability, and security according to the available resources.
AB - Naturally occurring and maliciously injected faults reduce the reliability of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and may leak confidential information. We developed an invariance-based concurrent error detection (CED) scheme which is independent of the implementation of AES encryption/decryption. Additionally, we improve the security of our scheme with Randomized CED Round Insertion and adaptive checking. Experimental results show that the invariance-based CED scheme detects all single-bit, all single-byte fault, and 99.99999997% of burst faults. The area and delay overheads of this scheme are compared with those of previously reported CED schemes on two Xilinx Virtex FPGAs. The hardware overhead is in the 13.2-27.3% range and the throughput is between 1.8-42.2Gbps depending on the AES architecture, FPGA family, and the detection latency. One can implement our scheme in many ways; designers can trade off performance, reliability, and security according to the available resources.
KW - concurrent error detection
KW - fault injection attack
KW - reliability
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84863545438&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1145/2228360.2228463
DO - 10.1145/2228360.2228463
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84863545438
SN - 9781450311991
T3 - Proceedings - Design Automation Conference
SP - 573
EP - 578
BT - Proceedings of the 49th Annual Design Automation Conference, DAC '12
T2 - 49th Annual Design Automation Conference, DAC '12
Y2 - 3 June 2012 through 7 June 2012
ER -