TY - GEN
T1 - IoT-enabled distributed cyber-attacks on transmission and distribution grids
AU - Dvorkin, Yury
AU - Garg, Siddharth
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 IEEE.
PY - 2017/11/13
Y1 - 2017/11/13
N2 - The Internet of things (IoT) will make it possible to interconnect and simultaneously control distributed electrical loads. Various technical and regulatory concerns have been raised that IoT-operated loads are being deployed without appropriately considering and systematically addressing potential cyber-security challenges. Hence, one can envision a hypothetical scenario when an ensemble of IoT-controlled loads can be hacked with malicious intentions of compromising operations of the electrical grid. Under this scenario, the attacker would use geographically distributed IoT-controlled loads to alternate their net power injections into the electrical grid in such a way that may disrupt normal grid operations. This paper presents a modeling framework to analyze grid impacts of distributed cyber-attacks on IoT-controlled loads. This framework is used to demonstrate how a hypothetical distributed cyber-attack propagates from the distribution electrical grid, where IoT-controlled loads are expected to be installed, to the transmission electrical grid. The techno-economic interactions between the distribution and transmission electrical grids are accounted for by means of bilevel optimization. The case study is carried out on the modified versions of the 3-area IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS) and the IEEE 13-bus distribution feeder. Our numerical results demonstrate that the severity of such attacks depends on the penetration level of IoT-controlled loads and the strategy of the attacker.
AB - The Internet of things (IoT) will make it possible to interconnect and simultaneously control distributed electrical loads. Various technical and regulatory concerns have been raised that IoT-operated loads are being deployed without appropriately considering and systematically addressing potential cyber-security challenges. Hence, one can envision a hypothetical scenario when an ensemble of IoT-controlled loads can be hacked with malicious intentions of compromising operations of the electrical grid. Under this scenario, the attacker would use geographically distributed IoT-controlled loads to alternate their net power injections into the electrical grid in such a way that may disrupt normal grid operations. This paper presents a modeling framework to analyze grid impacts of distributed cyber-attacks on IoT-controlled loads. This framework is used to demonstrate how a hypothetical distributed cyber-attack propagates from the distribution electrical grid, where IoT-controlled loads are expected to be installed, to the transmission electrical grid. The techno-economic interactions between the distribution and transmission electrical grids are accounted for by means of bilevel optimization. The case study is carried out on the modified versions of the 3-area IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS) and the IEEE 13-bus distribution feeder. Our numerical results demonstrate that the severity of such attacks depends on the penetration level of IoT-controlled loads and the strategy of the attacker.
KW - Cyber-security
KW - distributed cyber-atacks
KW - intemet-of-things
KW - smart appliances
KW - smart grid
KW - transmission and distribution integration
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85040634841&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1109/NAPS.2017.8107363
DO - 10.1109/NAPS.2017.8107363
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85040634841
T3 - 2017 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2017
BT - 2017 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2017
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2017 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2017
Y2 - 17 September 2017 through 19 September 2017
ER -