Abstract
This paper investigates the usefulness of non-choice data, namely response times, as a predictor of threshold behavior in a simple global game experiment. Our results indicate that the signals associated to the highest or second highest response time at the beginning of the experiment are both unbiased estimates of the threshold employed by subjects at the end of the experiment. This predictive ability is lost when we move to the third or higher response times. Moreover, the response time predictions are better than the equilibrium predictions of the game. They are also robust, in the sense that they characterize behavior in an “out-of-treatment” exercise where we use the strategy method to elicit thresholds.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 87-117 |
Number of pages | 31 |
Journal | Experimental Economics |
Volume | 24 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Mar 2021 |
Keywords
- Global games
- Response time
- Threshold strategies
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)