Is there a trade-off between security and liberty? Executive bias, privacy protections, and terrorism prevention

Tiberiu Dragu

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    I develop a game-theoretic model of an interaction between an antiterrorist agency and a terrorist organization to analyze how the probability of a terrorist attack varies when the level of privacy protections changes. I derive two implications. First, privacy and security from terrorism need not be in conflict: when accounting for strategic interactions, reducing privacy protections does not necessarily increase security from terrorism. Second, and more important, the antiterrorist agency will always want less privacy. The very agency whose expertise affords it disproportionate influence on policy making will prefer a reduction in privacy protections even when that reduction harms security from terrorism. The analysis has implications for understanding the relationship between government powers and civil liberties in the context of terrorism prevention and times of emergencies more generally.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)64-78
    Number of pages15
    JournalAmerican Political Science Review
    Volume105
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Feb 2011

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations

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