Issue advocacy and mass political sophistication

Catherine Hafer, Dimitri Landa

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We present a game-theoreticmodel of political discourse that explores how strategic incentives to make potentially persuasive arguments vary across different informational contexts. We show that political sophistication of the listeners fundamentally affects the speakers' incentives to make informative arguments, increasing the informed speech for speakers who are less likely to be successful in carrying the majority of the audience, and with it, the expected epistemic quality of majority choices.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)139-152
    Number of pages14
    JournalJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
    Volume169
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Mar 2013

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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