Abstract
We consider a signaling model where the sender's continuation value after signaling depends on his type, for instance because the receiver is able to update his posterior belief. As a leading example, we introduce Bayesian learning in a variety of environments ranging from simple two-period to continuous-time models with stochastic production. Signaling equilibria present two major departures from those obtained in models without learning. First, new mixed-strategy equilibria involving multiple pooling are possible. Second, pooling equilibria can survive the Intuitive Criterion when learning is efficient enough.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1787-1817 |
Number of pages | 31 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volume | 147 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 2012 |
Keywords
- Employer learning
- Intuitive Criterion
- Multiple pooling
- Signaling games
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics