Job market signaling and employer learning

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Julien Prat

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We consider a signaling model where the sender's continuation value after signaling depends on his type, for instance because the receiver is able to update his posterior belief. As a leading example, we introduce Bayesian learning in a variety of environments ranging from simple two-period to continuous-time models with stochastic production. Signaling equilibria present two major departures from those obtained in models without learning. First, new mixed-strategy equilibria involving multiple pooling are possible. Second, pooling equilibria can survive the Intuitive Criterion when learning is efficient enough.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1787-1817
Number of pages31
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number5
StatePublished - Sep 2012


  • Employer learning
  • Intuitive Criterion
  • Multiple pooling
  • Signaling games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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