Large extensive form games

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper provides a self-contained definition and a characterization of the class of extensive form games that are adequate for applications, but still do not employ any finiteness assumptions. In spite of its simplicity, the resulting definition is more general than the classical ones. Moreover, we show that this class satisfies the basic desiderata that strategies induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Within the class of playable extensive forms, the characterization is by the existence of an immediate predecessor function on the set of moves.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)75-102
Number of pages28
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume52
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2013

Keywords

  • Extensive form games
  • Sequential decision theory
  • Trees

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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    Alós-Ferrer, C., & Ritzberger, K. (2013). Large extensive form games. Economic Theory, 52(1), 75-102. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0674-y