Abstract
In a carbon auction, licenses for CO2 emissions are allocated among multiple interested players. Inspired by this setting, we consider repeated multi-unit auctions with uniform pricing, which are widely used in practice. Our contribution is to analyze these auctions in both the offline and online settings, by designing efficient bidding algorithms with low regret and giving regret lower bounds. We also analyze the quality of the equilibria in two main variants of the auction, finding that one variant is susceptible to collusion among the bidders while the other is not.
Original language | English (US) |
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Journal | Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems |
Volume | 36 |
State | Published - 2023 |
Event | 37th Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems, NeurIPS 2023 - New Orleans, United States Duration: Dec 10 2023 → Dec 16 2023 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Information Systems
- Signal Processing