Learning and Mechanism Design: An Experimental Test of School Matching Mechanisms with Intergenerational Advice

Tingting Ding, Andrew Schotter

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

    Abstract

    While the mechanisms that economists design are typically static, one-shot games, in the real world, mechanisms are used repeatedly by generations of agents who engage in them for a short period of time and then pass on advice to their successors. Hence, behaviour evolves via social learning and may diverge dramatically from that envisioned by the designer. We demonstrate that this is true of school matching mechanisms - even those for which truth-telling is a dominant strategy. Our results indicate that experience with an incentive-compatible mechanism may not foster truthful revelation if that experience is achieved via social learning.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)2779-2804
    Number of pages26
    JournalEconomic Journal
    Volume129
    Issue number10
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Oct 1 2019

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Learning and Mechanism Design: An Experimental Test of School Matching Mechanisms with Intergenerational Advice'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this