@article{dcc4cda4bc044fbf9358ee761e37dbab,
title = "Learning and Mechanism Design: An Experimental Test of School Matching Mechanisms with Intergenerational Advice",
abstract = "While the mechanisms that economists design are typically static, one-shot games, in the real world, mechanisms are used repeatedly by generations of agents who engage in them for a short period of time and then pass on advice to their successors. Hence, behaviour evolves via social learning and may diverge dramatically from that envisioned by the designer. We demonstrate that this is true of school matching mechanisms - even those for which truth-telling is a dominant strategy. Our results indicate that experience with an incentive-compatible mechanism may not foster truthful revelation if that experience is achieved via social learning.",
author = "Tingting Ding and Andrew Schotter",
note = "Funding Information: We would like to thank the editor and the two anonymous referees for their valuable comments. We would also like to thank, for their helpful discussions, participants in seminars and workshops at which this article was presented as a paper, at Ohio State University, Penn State University, University of California at San Diego, University of Michigan, University of Virginia, Tsinghua University and Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, as well as the 2014 North American ESA Conference, Shanghai Jiao Tong University Experimental Economics Workshop, the 2017 Shanghai Workshop on Behavioral and Experimental Economics, and SURE International Workshop. We would like to thank the Center for Experimental Social Science for its lab support, as well as Anwar Ruff for his programming assistance. Andrew Schotter thanks the National Science Foundation (grant number 1123045) for its financial support. Tinting Ding thanks the National Natural Science Foundation of China (grant number 71703094) and 2017 Shanghai Pujiang Talent Project (No. 17PJC040) for their financial support. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019 Royal Economic Society.",
year = "2019",
month = oct,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1093/ej/uez024",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "129",
pages = "2779--2804",
journal = "Economic Journal",
issn = "0013-0133",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "10",
}