Learning, bounded memory, and inertia

Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper considers bounded-memory players in a coordination game, who imitate the most successful remembered actions. With exogenous inertia, risk-dominant equilibria are selected independently of the length of memory. Without inertia, Pareto-dominant equilibria arise when memory is long enough.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)134-136
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number2
StatePublished - Nov 2008


  • Imitation
  • Inertia
  • Learning
  • Memory
  • Mutations

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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