Learning, bounded memory, and inertia

Carlos Alós-Ferrer

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2008.07.008

Learning, bounded memory, and inertia

Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper considers bounded-memory players in a coordination game, who imitate the most successful remembered actions. With exogenous inertia, risk-dominant equilibria are selected independently of the length of memory. Without inertia, Pareto-dominant equilibria arise when memory is long enough.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	134-136
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	101
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.07.008
State	Published - Nov 2008

Keywords

Imitation
Inertia
Learning
Memory
Mutations

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2008.07.008

Cite this

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title = "Learning, bounded memory, and inertia",

abstract = "This paper considers bounded-memory players in a coordination game, who imitate the most successful remembered actions. With exogenous inertia, risk-dominant equilibria are selected independently of the length of memory. Without inertia, Pareto-dominant equilibria arise when memory is long enough.",

keywords = "Imitation, Inertia, Learning, Memory, Mutations",

author = "Carlos Al{\'o}s-Ferrer",

note = "Funding Information: Financial support from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under Project P18141-G09 is gratefully acknowledged. ",

year = "2008",

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KW - Inertia

KW - Learning

KW - Memory

KW - Mutations

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JO - Economics Letters

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Learning, bounded memory, and inertia

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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