Abstract
Limited Aggregation is the view that when there are competing moral claims that demand our attention, we should sometimes satisfy the largest aggregate of claims, depending on the strength of the claims in question. In recent years, philosophers such as Patrick Tomlin and Alastair Norcross have argued that Limited Aggregation violates a number of rational choice principles such as Transitivity, Separability, and Contraction Consistency. Current versions of Limited Aggregation are what may be called Comparative Approaches because they involve assessing the relative strengths of various claims. In this paper, we offer a non-comparative version of Limited Aggregation, what we call the Threshold Approach. It states that there is a non-relative threshold that separates various claims. We demonstrate that the Threshold Approach does not violate rational choice principles such as Transitivity, Separability, and Contraction Consistency, and we show that potential concerns regarding such a view are surmountable.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 148-167 |
Journal | Utilitas |
Volume | 36 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jun 1 2024 |
Keywords
- limited aggregation
- nonconsequentialism
- threshold
- transitivity
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
- Sociology and Political Science