Local equilibria in economic games

Carlos Alós-Ferrer; Ana B. Ania

doi:10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00371-2

Local equilibria in economic games

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Ana B. Ania

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study solution concepts for economic games that are resistant to local deviations. Strategy spaces are subsets of R^l and local deviations are small in the Euclidean metric. We define local Nash equilibrium and local evolutionarily stable strategy, and present applications to Walrasian outcomes in Cournot games and separating outcomes in screening models.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	165-173
Number of pages	9
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	70
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00371-2
State	Published - Feb 2001

Keywords

C72
Cournot
ESS
Nash equilibrium
Screening

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00371-2

Cite this

@article{a0b01571a35441f3bf9046a6846250d6,

title = "Local equilibria in economic games",

abstract = "We study solution concepts for economic games that are resistant to local deviations. Strategy spaces are subsets of Rl and local deviations are small in the Euclidean metric. We define local Nash equilibrium and local evolutionarily stable strategy, and present applications to Walrasian outcomes in Cournot games and separating outcomes in screening models.",

keywords = "C72, Cournot, ESS, Nash equilibrium, Screening",

author = "Carlos Al{\'o}s-Ferrer and Ania, {Ana B.}",

year = "2001",

month = feb,

doi = "10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00371-2",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "70",

pages = "165--173",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",

publisher = "Elsevier",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Local equilibria in economic games

AU - Alós-Ferrer, Carlos

AU - Ania, Ana B.

PY - 2001/2

Y1 - 2001/2

N2 - We study solution concepts for economic games that are resistant to local deviations. Strategy spaces are subsets of Rl and local deviations are small in the Euclidean metric. We define local Nash equilibrium and local evolutionarily stable strategy, and present applications to Walrasian outcomes in Cournot games and separating outcomes in screening models.

AB - We study solution concepts for economic games that are resistant to local deviations. Strategy spaces are subsets of Rl and local deviations are small in the Euclidean metric. We define local Nash equilibrium and local evolutionarily stable strategy, and present applications to Walrasian outcomes in Cournot games and separating outcomes in screening models.

KW - C72

KW - Cournot

KW - ESS

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - Screening

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0035579007&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0035579007&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00371-2

DO - 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00371-2

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0035579007

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 70

SP - 165

EP - 173

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 2

ER -

Local equilibria in economic games

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this