Local equilibria in economic games

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Ana B. Ania

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We study solution concepts for economic games that are resistant to local deviations. Strategy spaces are subsets of Rl and local deviations are small in the Euclidean metric. We define local Nash equilibrium and local evolutionarily stable strategy, and present applications to Walrasian outcomes in Cournot games and separating outcomes in screening models.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)165-173
Number of pages9
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number2
StatePublished - Feb 2001


  • C72
  • Cournot
  • ESS
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Screening

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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