TY - GEN
T1 - Locally-Aware Constrained Games on Networks
AU - Peng, Guanze
AU - Li, Tao
AU - Liu, Shutian
AU - Chen, Juntao
AU - Zhu, Quanyan
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 American Automatic Control Council.
PY - 2021/5/25
Y1 - 2021/5/25
N2 - Network games have been instrumental in understanding strategic behaviors over networks for applications such as critical infrastructure networks, social networks, and cyber-physical systems. One critical challenge of network games is that the behaviors of the players are constrained by the underlying physical laws or safety rules, and the players may not have complete knowledge of network-wide constraints. To this end, this paper proposes a game framework to study constrained games on networks, where the players are locally aware of the constraints. We use awareness levels to capture the scope of the network constraints that players are aware of. We first define and show the existence of generalized Nash equilibria (GNE) of the game, and point out that higher awareness levels of the players would lead to a larger set of GNE solutions. We use necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize the GNE, and propose the concept of the dual game to show that one can convert a locally-aware constrained game into a two-layer unconstrained game problem. We use linear quadratic games as case studies to corroborate the analytical results, and in particular, show the duality between Bertrand games and Cournot games.
AB - Network games have been instrumental in understanding strategic behaviors over networks for applications such as critical infrastructure networks, social networks, and cyber-physical systems. One critical challenge of network games is that the behaviors of the players are constrained by the underlying physical laws or safety rules, and the players may not have complete knowledge of network-wide constraints. To this end, this paper proposes a game framework to study constrained games on networks, where the players are locally aware of the constraints. We use awareness levels to capture the scope of the network constraints that players are aware of. We first define and show the existence of generalized Nash equilibria (GNE) of the game, and point out that higher awareness levels of the players would lead to a larger set of GNE solutions. We use necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize the GNE, and propose the concept of the dual game to show that one can convert a locally-aware constrained game into a two-layer unconstrained game problem. We use linear quadratic games as case studies to corroborate the analytical results, and in particular, show the duality between Bertrand games and Cournot games.
KW - Bertrand Duopoly
KW - Constrained Games
KW - Cournot Duopoly
KW - Duality
KW - Games with Incomplete Information
KW - Network Games
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85111910906&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.23919/ACC50511.2021.9482895
DO - 10.23919/ACC50511.2021.9482895
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85111910906
T3 - Proceedings of the American Control Conference
SP - 4606
EP - 4611
BT - 2021 American Control Conference, ACC 2021
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2021 American Control Conference, ACC 2021
Y2 - 25 May 2021 through 28 May 2021
ER -